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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution carries a

guarantee: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public

* J.D. 2000, University of San Diego School of Law; B.S. 1993, San Diego State
University.

Safety may require it."' The Supreme Court has held that this mandate
is not violated so long as habeas review or its equivalent remains
available.2 Despite this protection, in Richardson v. Reno3 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the permanent provisions of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

("IIRIRA") preclude "habeas [corpus] jurisdiction over an alien's
petition challenging his removal proceedings and detention pending
removal proceedings."
The practical result of this holding is to
eliminate the availability of all judicial review, including habeas corpus
review, to aliens held removable by the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") because they committed certain criminal
offenses.!
This Casenote questions the Richardson court's holding. Specifically,

this Casenote argues that precluding all judicial review, including habeas
corpus review, for criminal aliens held removable by the INS violates
the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution. Further, to

interpret IIRIRA as eliminating the availability of habeas corpus relief in
these circumstances calls into question the constitutionality of the statute
due to constitutional limits on Congress's power to control the
jurisdiction of Article III courts.
II. IIRIRA
In 1996, Congress made a significant change to statutory immigration

law: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
2. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (stating that the Suspension
Clause is not violated by the substitution of a remedy that is neither inadequate nor
ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention).
3. 180 F.3d 1311 (llth Cir. 1999).
4. Id. at 1315. Currently, the availability of judicial review for removal orders
varies widely depending on the circuit in which the alien sits. See Liang v. INS, 206
F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[T]raditional habeas review under § 2241 survived the
enactment of... IIRIRA." (quoting Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 114546 (1999))); Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1049 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the district
court retained jurisdiction over aliens' habeas petition challenging their detention
pending execution of final removal orders, to the extent the permanent provisions of
IIRIRA applied). But see Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2000)
("[T]he jurisdictional limitation described throughout § 1252 [of IIRIRA is] sufficiently
explicit [to eliminate habeas corpus]."); Alanis-Bustamante v. Reno, 201 F.3d 1303,
1307 (1 th Cir. 2000) (holding that the permanent provisions of IRIRA preclude habeas
review).
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal
against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal
offense ....).
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of 1996.6

"[A]imed at alleviating the negative public response to

America's growing population of illegal immigrants," the permanent
provisions of IIRIRA became effective on April 1, 1997.
Like its predecessor, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"),
IIRIRA provides for the removal of certain criminal aliens.' However,
URIRA significantly expanded the types of crimes for which an alien
can be removed. "Previously, only murder, drug trafficking, firearms
trafficking, and crimes of violence punishable by imprisonment of at
least five years"" were considered aggravated felonies, the commission
of which constituted grounds for removal. IIRIRA expanded the
definition of aggravated felony to include "thefts, burglaries, crimes of
violence punishable by a sentence exceeding one year, rape, sexual
abuse of a minor, money laundering, fraud or tax evasion of $I0,000 or
more, kidnapping, child pornography, RICO offenses, pimping, and
document trafficking."' 2 The expanded definition applies retroactively.' 3
6. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
7. Jason H. Ehrenberg, A Callfor Reform of Recent Immigration Legislation, 32
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 195, 195 (1998).
8. Goncalves v. Reno, 144F.3d 110, 116 (IstCir. 1998).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 204 (1952).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Any alien who is convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years ... after the date of
admission, and is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed, is deportable."); id § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) ("Any alien who at any time after
admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out
of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and
regardless of whether the convictions were in a single trial, is deportable."); id.§
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable."); see also id. § 1182(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing
that any alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or a violation of any law or
regulation relating to a controlled substance is inadmissible and thus is ineligible to be
admitted to the United States).
11. Ehrenberg, supra note 7, at 198.
12. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law
(including any effective date), the term [aggravated felony] applies regardless of whether
the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996."). Retroactive
application of IRIRA has permitted the INS to commence removal proceedings against
a new class of aggravated felons, regardless of how long ago they committed their
offenses. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive DeportationLaws and
the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998); Bruce Robert Marley, Comment,
Exiling the New Felons: The Consequencesof the RetroactiveApplication of Aggravated
Felony Convictions to Lawfiul PermanentResidents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 855 (1998);
Michelle Slayton, Comment, Interim Decision No. 3333: The Brief Casual, and
Innocent Conundrum, 33 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1029 (1999).

IRIRA also effected a change in the level of discretion afforded the
Attorney General. Specifically, under the INA, the Attorney General
was granted "discretion to withhold the deportation of criminal aliens in
certain circumstances.' 4 Section 305 of IIRIRA eliminated this
discretion and invoked automatic removal on the grounds that an alien
who has been convicted of an aggravated felony represents a "per se
danger to the American public and is therefore ineligible for relief from
the Attorney General."' 5
The form of removal proceedings is governed by § 1229a."6 Section
1229a provides that an "alien may file one motion to reconsider a
decision that the alien is removable from the United States ... within 30
days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal."' 7
Further, an "alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings ... within
90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal."'"
The language of § 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes direct judicial review of a
final administrative order of removal in certain circumstances.' 9 Section
1252(a)(2)(C) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal
against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a
criminal offense covered in § 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C),
or (D) of this title."'

III. THE RICHARDSON DECISION
A.

FactualBackground

Ralph Richardson ("Richardson"), a citizen and national of Haiti, had
resided continuously in the United States as a lawful permanent resident
since 1968.1 On October 26, 1997, Richardson and his family returned
14. Ehrenberg, supra note 7, at 200.
15. Id.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (Supp. IV 1998); see also id. § 1228 (Supp. IV 1998)
(providing for expedited removal of aliens convicted of committing aggravated felonies).
Under the INA, the legal rights of aliens depended on whether they were classified as
"deportable" (i.e., aliens who had entered the United States) or "excludable" (i.e., aliens
who had not yet entered the country); Slayton, supra note 13, at 1041-42. IIRIRA
combined "excludable" and "deportable" aliens into one class of "removable" aliens.
See 8 U.S.C § 1229a(e)(2). Removal proceedings are now the "sole and exclusive
procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if
the alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States." Id. § 1229a(a)(3).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5)(A)-(B).
18. Id. § 1229a(c)(6)(A)-(C).
19. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1998).
20. Id.
21. Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11 th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S.
1142 (1999), aff'd, 180 F.3d 1311 (1 lth Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Richardson 1].
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from a two-day trip to Haiti.? The INS detained Richardson at Miami

International Airport.
prior criminal

Upon questioning, he admitted that he had two

convictions,

including a conviction

for cocaine

trafficking. 24 This admission resulted in Richardson's detention at the
Krome Detention Center.?
Richardson was detained, without
opportunity for release on bond, while the INS instituted removal
proceedings against him on the basis of his criminal convictions.'

On November 13, 1997, Richardson requested that the INS release
him from custody.'

This request was denied on December 4, 1997.2

On November 18, 1997, while awaiting a response from the INS,
Richardson requested a release on bond pending his deportation from the
immigration judge at the Krome Detention Center." This request was
denied, without a hearing, on November 24, 1997." Following that

decision, Richardson filed a petition in the Southern District of Florida
for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241." In his petition,
22. Richardson1, 162 F.3d at 1343.
23. Ld.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Section 1182 provides that any alien convicted of a violation of any law or
regulation relating to a controlled substance is inadmissible, and thus, is ineligible to be
admitted to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
27. RichardsonI, 162 F.3d at 1343.
28. 1&
29. ML
30. Id. The immigration judge found that Richardson was seeking admission
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Richardson 1 162
F.3d at 1343. Section 1101 provides that "[a]n alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the
United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien... has committed
[certain crimes]." 28 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(13)(C)(v) (emphasis added). Since aliens
seeking admission to the United States can only request release from detention from a
district director, the immigration judge denied Richardson's request for lack of
jurisdiction. Richardson , 162 F.3d at 1343.
31. Ld.; see also Richardson v. Reno, 994 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
rev'd, 162 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999), aq'd, 180 F.3d
1311 (llth Cir. 1999). Section 2241 provides:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the
district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States.. . or

Richardson argued that the immigration judge's decision violated his

constitutional right, as a lawful permanent resident alien, to a bond
hearing. 2
The district court held that it had jurisdiction over
Richardson's petition and that Richardson was entitled to an
individualized bond hearing.3 The court reasoned that "there is a strong

presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action."

Therefore, in the absence of express congressional intent to repeal
habeas jurisdiction,
35 it retained jurisdiction, pursuant to IURIRA, over
Richardson's writ.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
ordered the district court to dismiss Richardson's habeas petition.36 The
court held that "IIRIRA strips all jurisdiction, including § 2241 habeas,
from the district courts, places exclusive judicial review in the court of
appeals, and delays even that judicial review until after a final
administrative agency order., 37 The court reasoned that the broad,
jurisdiction-limiting language of § 1252(g) sufficiently illustrated
congressional intent to repeal the district court's habeas jurisdiction.
On June 1, 1999, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the

Eleventh Circuit's judgment, and remanded the case for further

consideration39 in light of its decision in Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscriminationCommittee.0

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Supp. IV 1998).
32. Richardson, 994 F. Supp. at 1468. Specifically, Richardson disputed the
immigration judge's finding that he was an "arriving alien" within the purview of §
1101. Id.
33. Id. at 1468-69.
34. Id. at 1468.
35. See id. at 1469 ("Congress knows how to repeal habeas jurisdiction. Where it
intends to do so, it states that intention expressly.").
36. Richardson 1, 162 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1142
(1999), aff'd, 180 F.3d 1311 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
37. Id. at 1345.
38. Id. at 1345, 1354. Section 1252(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien under this chapter.
8 U.S.C. §1252(g) (Supp. IV 1998).
39. Richardson v. Reno, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999). Upon remand, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its holding. Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311, 1318
(11 th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Richardson II].
40. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
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B. The Holding
American-Arab involved resident aliens who filed suit against the
Attorney General alleging that they had been targeted for removal due to
their affiliation with a politically unpopular group.4 ' The United States

Supreme Court considered whether their constitutional claim was
precluded by § 1252(g). ' 2 Adopting a narrow interpretation of the
provision, the Court held that § 1252(g) only precluded judicial review

of the Attorney General's discrete acts of commencing proceedings,

adjudicating cases, and executing removal orders. 3 Thus, § 1252(g)
does not preclude judicial review of final orders of deportation.
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in American-Arab, the

Richardson II court, on remand, modified its reasoning. Specifically,
the court reasoned that since Richardson's habeas petition did not

involve a decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders, the jurisdiction-limiting provisions of §
1252(g) did not apply." Despite its change of heart with respect to the
application of § 1252(g), the Eleventh Circuit maintained its position

that "IIRIRA precludes § 2241 habeas jurisdiction over an alien's
petition challenging his removal proceedings and detention pending

removal proceedings."'

In support of its contention that the district

court's exercise of habeas jurisdiction over Richardson was improper,

the court maintained that § 1252(b)(9) "provides clear evidence of
Congress' desire to 'abbreviat[e] judicial review [including habeas
corpus review] to one place and one time: only in the court of appeals
and only after a final removal order and exhaustion of all administrative
remedies." '46
41. Id. at 472.
42. Ild.
at 473.
43. Id.at 482. Because the aliens' challenge to the Attorney General's decision to
commence removal proceedings against them fell "squarely within § 1252(g),' the Court
held that IIRIRA deprived it of jurisdiction over the action. Id. at 487.
44. RichardsonII, 180 F.3d at 1314.
45. Ld.
at 1315.
46. Id.at 1314 (quoting Richardson 1, 162 F.3d at 1354). Section 1252(b)(9)
provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and
application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action
taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under
this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under
this section.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (Supp. IV 1998).

C. Analysis
The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the scope of §
1252(b)(9). However, in American-Arab it referred, in dicta, to §
1252(b)(9) as an "unmistakable 'zipper' clause" that "covers the
universe of deportation claims. 4 7 The Richardson II court interpreted
the dicta of the Supreme Court so as to apply § 1252(b)(9) to an alien's
habeas corpus petition regardless of what aspect of the removal
proceeding the petitioner challenged* 8 In applying § 1252(b)(9),
the Richardson II court held that the grant of "judicial review"
contained therein is exclusive in that it precludes all other forms
of judicial review, including habeas corpus.49 Thus, pursuant to §
1252(b)(9), "Richardson's § 2241 petition must await a final...
removal order [by the Board of Immigration Appeals] and can occur
[only] in the court of appeals through a petition to review that final
order."'
The Richardson II court's reasoning is deficient on several grounds.
First, the plain language of IRIRA indicates that § 1252(b)(9) is not
applicable in this case. Section 1252(b) explicitly limits its application
to removal proceedings which fall under § 1252(a)(1)." A removal
proceeding in which an alien is removable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense is governed by § 1252(a)(2)(C), not §
1252(a)(1).12 Given the clarity of the statutory language, it is
inappropriate to expand judicially the coverage of § 1252(b)(9).'
Second, the court's assertion that IRIRA's limitation of ordinary
appellate review encompasses habeas corpus review is problematic.
47. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 526 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999);
see also Richardson II, 180 F.3d at 1315 ("[T]he Supreme Court in American-Arab,
albeit in dicta, described the text of [§ 1252(b)(9)] as a 'general jurisdictional
limitation."') (emphasis added).
48. Richardson I,180 F.3d at 1315.
49. Id. As discussed supra Part III.B., the court reasoned that § 1252(b)(9)
"provides clear evidence of Congress' desire to 'abbreviat[e] judicial review [including
habeas corpus review] to one place and one time: only in the court of appeals and only
after a final removal order and exhaustion of all administrative remedies."' Id. at 1314
(quoting Richardson I, 162 F. 3d at 1354).
50. Id.
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) ("With respect to review of an order of removal under
subsection (a)(]) of this section, the following requirements apply...." (emphasis
added)).
52. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court
shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is
removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section
1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title ....).
53. See City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994) (stating that
courts must first look to the plain language of the statute when interpreting statutory
language).
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"The Supreme Court has long distinguished between judicial review of
an appeal and 'the courts' power to entertain petitions for writs of habeas
corpus."'''
Throughout the history of immigration statutes, "aliens
without other recourse have traditionally been able to obtain review by
habeas corpus, even in the face of statutory language precluding all other
review. '' -S In Heikcila v. Barber,' for example, the Supreme Court
upheld an alien's right to challenge his executive detention by filing a
writ of habeas corpus even though the 1917 Immigration Act explicitly
precluded judicial review." "In so holding, the Court rejected the
conclusions of several lower courts that judicial review included habeas
corpus. ' It follows that IIRIRA's limitation of appellate review does
not extend to habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Equally problematic is the court's assertion that the sweeping
language of § 1252(b)(9) sufficiently illustrates congressional intent to
repeal the district court's habeas corpus jurisdiction. "" The court
attempts to bolster its argument by citing to § 1252(e)(2), which
expressly provides for habeas review in certain limited circumstances.
Specifically, the court argues that the existence of this provision
"evidences Congress' ability to create statutory habeas review.., when
it so desires."'" The court's argument is not persuasive in light of two
Supreme Court precedents.
In Exparte Yerger and Felker v. Turpin,3 the United States Supreme
Court "establish[ed] the propositions that courts should not lightly
presume that a congressional enactment containing general language
effects a repeal of a jurisdictional statute, and, consequently, that only a
54. Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 671 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sandoval v. Reno,
166 F.3d 225,235 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953))).
55. Id.; see also Jean-Baptiste v. Reno, 144 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 1998); Mansour v.
INS, 123 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the transitional rles of IIRIRA.
which barred judicial review of deportation orders based on specified criminal offenses,
were not unconstitutional since judicial involvement in the form of habeas review
remained available).
56. 345 U.S. 229 (1953).
57. Id. at 234-35.
58. Pak, 196 F.3d at 672 (citing Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 235-36).
59. Richardson II, 180 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (11 th Cir. 1999).
60. Id. at 1314; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Judicial review
of any determination made under section 1225(b)(1) of this title is available in habeas
corpus proceedings....").
61. RichardsonII, 180 F.3d at 1314.
62. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).

63.

518 U.S. 651 (1996).

plain statement of congressional intent to remove a particular statutory
"Felker and Yerger... adopted a
grant of jurisdiction will suffice."
general rule of construction that any repeal of the federal courts' historic
habeas jurisdiction must be explicit and make express reference
specifically to the statute granting jurisdiction."65 As indicated above, §
1252(b)(9) does not contain such explicit language.6 Rather, it repeals
habeas power only by implication.
Since Felker was decided before IIRIRA was enacted, we must
assume that Congress was "aware of the [Supreme] Court's holding that
it cannot repeal habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 by implication, but
only by express command." 67 Therefore, had Congress intended to
eliminate habeas corpus review under § 2241, it would have inserted an
explicit reference to that provision.6 Based upon the above, even if §
1252(b)(9) were held to apply to criminal aliens, its jurisdiction limiting
provisions would not preclude the availability of habeas corpus.
Finally, the Richardson II court's interpretation of IIRIRA does not
pass constitutional muster. The Constitution of the United States
mandates that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."
In Swain v. Pressley," the United States
Supreme Court held that this mandate is not violated so long as habeas
corpus review or its equivalent remains available. 1
As indicated above, a removal proceeding in which an alien is held
removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense is governed
by § 1252(a)(2)(C). 72 The plain language of § 1252(a)(2)(C) eliminates
the availability of "judicial review" for certain criminal aliens." Under
Richardson II, this limitation applies equally to all forms of judicial

64. Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1999).
65. Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 672 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Goncalves v. Reno, 144
F.3d 110, 120 (1st Cir. 1998)).
66. See supra note 46.
67. Pak, 196 F.3d at 672-73 (citing Felker, 518 U.S at 661).
68. Id. at 672; cf Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 235 (finding that there is not a
"sufficiently clear statement of congressional intent to repeal the general grant of habeas
jurisdiction" under IIRIRA's provisional rules). But cf.Max-George v. Reno, 205 F. 3d
194, 199 (5th Cir. 2000) ("While Congress could theoretically have been more explicit
by specifically mentioning habeas corpus in general or § 2241 in particular, we believe
the jurisdictional limitation described throughout § 1252 was sufficiently explicit.").
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
70. 430 U.S. 372 (1977).
71. See id. at 381 ("[T]he substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither
inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.").
72. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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review: ordinary appellate review and collateral review."' Therefore, the
practical result of the Richardson II court's holding is to
unconstitutionally eliminate all forms of judicial review, including
habeas corpus, to aliens held to be removable because they committed
certain criminal offenses.
While the Richardson II court seems to concede that § 1252(a)(2)(C)
eliminates all forms of judicial review, it maintains that the Suspension
Clause is not violated because, "[a]t a minimum, judicial review remains
available.., under [§ 1252(a)(2)(C)] to determine if the specific
conditions exist that bar jurisdiction in the court of appeals."' Further,
"[i]f the bar applies, jurisdiction remains to consider whether the level of
judicial review remaining in [§ 1252(a)(2)(C)] in a particular case
satisfies the Suspension Clause. If not,... adequate and effective
judicial review of statutory and constitutional issues [remains available]
under [§ 1252(b)(9)]. ' " This reasoning is faulty. According to the
court, a criminal alien can only raise a claim of substantial constitutional
error pursuant to § 1252(b)(9), that is, judicial review by the court of
appeals. As indicated above, however, the plain language of IIRIRA
does not provide for application of § 1252(b)(9) to criminal aliens.'
Further, there is no other provision granting the federal courts of appeal
jurisdiction over substantial constitutional claims raised by criminal
aliens.
Additionally, the Richardson II court's interpretation may
unconstitutionally limit the jurisdiction of Article In courts. The power
of Congress to regulate the flow of aliens into the United States has
historically been described by the courts as "plenary."' 3 Courts have
consistently justified this deference by describing "the power to control
the flow of aliens... [as] an inherent and necessary exercise of national
sovereignty." ' Accordingly, federal courts have accepted the authority
of Congress to limit their jurisdiction with respect to removal orders
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.

See Richardson I, 180 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).

Id.
Id.
See supratext accompanying notes 51-53.
Henry E. Velte, Note, Mansour v. INS: Sixth Circuit Holds JudicialReview of

FinalOrders of DeportationAgainst Certain CriminalAliens Available Solely Through
Habeas Corpus Proceedings,6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 671, 675 (1998) (citing Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("[Olver no conceivable subject is the legislative

power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.") (internal
quotation omitted)).
79. Id. (citing Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,210 (1953)).

against aliens.Wo

However,

no court has identified

a specific

constitutional provision which explicitly grants Congress this seemingly

limitless power to regulate immigration.8 ' Further, "[t]he grant of
plenary power to Congress over immigration matters has been afforded
far less deference when the exercise of that power interfered with
substantive constitutional rights, including the right to seek habeas
corpus."82
In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 3 the United States
Supreme Court indicated that, whenever possible, a statute should be
interpreted in a manner that renders it constitutionally valid.' The
holding of Richardson II should be rejected because it conflicts with this
demand. A constitutional reading of IIRIRA must preserve access to the
writ of habeas corpus under § 2241.
IV. APPLICATION OF IIRIRA TO CRIMINAL ALIENS

A.

Subject MatterJurisdiction

Section 1252(a)(2)(C) effectively precludes all forms of judicial
review for aliens held removable by reason of having committed a

criminal offense. However, as previously discussed, this limitation on
judicial review should not be interpreted to include habeas corpus."

Thus, it should be recognized that, even after IIRIRA, criminal aliens
retain their constitutional right to seek writs of habeas corpus in the
district courts. However, in this and other contexts the availability of
habeas relief has been somewhat limited. Specifically, before an alien
may seek habeas corpus relief, he must first show that he has adequately
80. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) (finding that Congress has
the power to regulate exclusion, admission, and expulsion of aliens and, thus, may
delegate this power exclusively to executive officers with "such opportunity for judicial
review of their action as Congress may see fit to authorize or permit"); see also Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (stating that Congress has the exclusive power to
regulate aliens).
81. Velte, supra note 78, at 675 (citing Margaret Gaisford, Note, Ideologically
Excluded Aliens and Their Entitlement to Fundamental ProceduralRights, 13 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 229, 231-32 (1989)).
82. Id. (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939,
950-51(1997)); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) (holding that
aliens are not wholly without constitutional protection); Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423,
426 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the statutory elimination of federal court jurisdiction to
review a final deportation order is not unconstitutional so long as "some avenue for
judicial review remains available"); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 310-11 (3d Cir.
1996) (holding that "[t]o the extent.., constitutional rights applicable to aliens [are] at
stake, judicial review may not be withdrawn by statute").
83. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
84. Id. at 762.
85. See supra Part III.C.
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exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is "in custody."
B. Exhaustion Requirement
In Nakaranurackv. United States," the Ninth Circuit held that an alien
challenging a removal order by means of a writ of habeas corpus must
first exhaust all available administrative remedies." The court expressed
concern that "routinely allowing aliens to bypass the normal review
process by the simple expedient of filing habeas petitions could easily
result in the exception swallowing the rule."' ' Accordingly, the court
concluded that "an alien may petition for habeas [corpus] review of a
deportation order only if the issues raised concerning the validity of that
deportation order had not and could not have been determined in a prior
judicial proceeding."'
Although Nakaranurack was decided preI[RIRA, the court's reasoning regarding exhaustion is sound.
As indicated above, § 1229a specifically identifies the administrative
appellate remedies available to an alien held to be removable., The
section permits a removable alien to file one motion to reconsider?' and
one motion to reopen the removal proceedings. ' Under § 1252(a)(2)(C),
there is plainly no judicial review of a final order of removal for an alien
who is held to be removable because he has committed a criminal act.
However, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected
the notion that "judicial review" includes habeas corpus. Therefore, the
statute's failure to provide for judicial review does not strip the courts of
habeas corpus jurisdiction which has been explicitly granted to them by

§ 2241.
C. Custody Requirement
In order to grant a writ of habeas corpus, the court must first find that
the petitioner was "in custody" at the time the writ was filed! 3 In the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

68 F.3d 290 (9th Cir. 1995).
1I at 293.
Id.
1& at 294.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1998).
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6) (Supp. IV 1998).

93. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (Supp. IV 1998); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,
7 (1998) (holding that the "in custody" requirement is satisfied as long as petitioner was
incarcerated at the time the habeas petition was filed).

context of immigration-related habeas petitions, custody has been
construed broadly to include restraints on liberty beyond physical
incarceration or detention (i.e., constructive custody).9 Thus, in Flores
v. INS,9 the court found "sufficient immediacy of action and interference
with freedom to support habeas corpus jurisdiction" where aliens were
under deportation orders, but were not being physically detained by the
INS.' Likewise, in Nakaranurack,the court held that the "in custody"
requirement is satisfied by "situations in which an alien is not suffering
any actual physical detention." ' The court reasoned that "so long as he
is subject to a final order of deportation, an alien is deemed to be 'in
custody"' for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction. 98
As the above authority indicates, the petitioner's physical
incarceration status is not determinative for purposes of habeas corpus
jurisdiction. Rather, a petitioner may be deemed to be "in custody" for
purposes of habeas corpus so long as he is subject to a final order of
removal.
V. CONCLUSION

As this Casenote indicates, application of the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Richardson v. Reno would effectively eliminate all forms of
judicial review, including habeas corpus, for aliens held to be removable
from the United States because they committed certain criminal
offenses. The court's holding can be criticized on several grounds: it is
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, it conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent, and it suffers from constitutional infirmities.
As such, the position represented by the court's holding should be
summarily rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Such rejection
would go a long way toward achieving standardization of federal
immigration laws.
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94. See Duran v. Reno, 193 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that custody for
habeas corpus purposes is not limited to actual, physical confinement) (citing Frazier v.
Wilkinson, 842 F.2d 42, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Hensley v. Municipal Court,
411 U.S. 345, 351-53 (1973).
95. 524 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1975).
96. Id. at 629.
97. Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1995).
98. Id.; see also Mustata v. United States, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022 n.4 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding that an alien is constructively in custody when he is subject to a final order of
deportation); Then v. INS, 37 F. Supp. 2d 346, 354 n.8 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that the "in
custody" requirement is satisfied where an alien is "subject to a final order of deportation
but not yet deported").

